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DIVIDEND WITHHOLDING FOR THIRD COUNTRY
INVESTORS UNDER THE UNITED STATES-
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES TAX TREATY
The Internal Revenue Code imposes an income tax of 30% on divi-
dends paid by U.S. corporations to foreign corporations or nonresident
aliens.1 The United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty (Treaty),2 a bi-
lateral agreement, permits taxation of dividends paid by U.S. corporations
to recipients in the Netherlands Antilles (Antilles) at less than the 30% stat-
utory rate. The purpose of this and other U.S. bilateral tax treaties3 that
allow U.S. corporations to withhold tax on dividends at less than the 30%
statutory rate4 is to prevent double taxation. Presumably, treaty countries
themselves impose significant rates of taxation on income received from
abroad.5 The Antilles, however, is a tax haven as well as a treaty country.
It permits persons who are neither residents nor citizens of the Antilles to
incorporate investment companies upon which it levies unusually low levels
of taxation.6 Third country investors7 may-at least in theory-invest in
1. 1.RLC. §§ 871 (individuals), 881 (corporations). The tax is deducted and withheld at
the source, I.R.C. §§ 1441-1442, generally by the payor corporation, Schneidmann, Dividend
Withholding under the United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax Treaty, 31 TAX LAW. 437, 439
n.14 (1978). The 30% rate does not apply to income "effectively connected with the conduct of
a trade or business within the United States." I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a). This Note will use
the term "income" as not including "effectively connected" income.
2. Convention on Income Taxes, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1855, extended by Protocol Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antilles,
June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, modfed by Protocol Modifying and Supple-
menting the Extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the Convention of April 29, 1948, Oct.
23, 1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty].
3. U.S. tax treaty partners include most Western developed countries and some less de-
veloped countries. Conspicuous by their absence are the members of OPEC (except Nigeria),
Latin American and Asian nations, and most of Africa. See 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 61
(1977) (Table 1); Gifford, Permanent Establishments Under the Nondiscrimination Clause in In-
come Tax Treaties, 11 CORNELL INTL LJ. 51, 51-52 n.1 (1978).
4. I.R.C. §§894(a), 7852(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.871-12 (1974).
5. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS WITH
LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN, AND JAPAN, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong.,2d Sess. 51 (1964), reprinted in 1965-1 C.B. 633, 669 [hereinafter cited as SENATE EXECTIVE
REPORT].
6. See generally ALGEMENE BANK NEDERLAND N.V., TAXATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
ANTILLES (2d ed. 1972); [1969] NETHERLANDS ANTILLES INCOME TAX SERVICE (FTLA).
7. The term "third country investor" as used in this Note denotes an investor who is
neither a citizen nor a resident of either treaty country. In the case of the Antilles Treaty,
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the United States through Antilles investment companies and thereby take
advantage of the reduced Treaty tax rates on dividends.
Although the United States has attempted to restrict the use of this tax
avoidance scheme by third country investors,8 several recent private letter
rulings9 issued by the Internal Revenue Service appear to confirm the valid-
ity of this type of arrangement. The letter rulings, however, do not contain
any elucidation of the Service's reasoning in permitting the lower withhold-
ing rates. This Note will analyze the dividend provisions of the Treaty and
explore the reasons for and implications of the letter rulings. It will then
evaluate the IRS approach, concluding with recommendations for resolving
the problems created by this approach.
I
STRUCTURE OF DIVIDEND TAXATION UNDER THE
ANTILLES TREATY
A. PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL
As originally signed, the Treaty reduced the 30% statutory withholding
rate to a 15% rate' 0 or, in the case of dividend payments by U.S. subsidiar-
ies to Antilles parent corporations, to a 5% rate.11 This scheme of dividend
taxation was premised upon the existence of a substantial income tax rate in
the Antilles.12 But the Antilles provides special tax benefits for companies
investors who are citizens, residents, or corporations of the Netherlands are often treated as
Treaty country investors.
8. See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
9. Letter Rul. No. 7815026, [1978] IRS LETrER RULING REP. (Jan. 12, 1978); Letter Rul.
No. 7748013, [1977] IRS LETTrR RULING REP. (Aug. 30, 1977); Letter Rul. No. 7746046,
[1977] IRS LETrER RULING REP. (Aug. 17, 1977); Letter Rul. No. 7742058, [1977] IRS LETrER
RULING REP. (July 25, 1977); Letter Rul. No. 7742048, [1977] IRS LETrER RULING REP. (July
22, 1977); Letter Rul. No. 7739080, [1977] IRS LETTER RULING REP. (July 1, 1977). Hereinaf-
ter letter rulings will be cited by number only.
10. Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(l). This provision states:
The rate of United States tax on dividends derived from a United States corporation
by a resident or corporation of the Netherlands not engaged in trade or business in the
United States through a permanent establishment shall not exceed 15 percent ....
11. Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(l). This provision states:
[S]uch rate of tax shall not exceed 5 percent if such Netherlands [Antilles] corporation
controls, directly or indirectly, at least 95 percent of the entire voting power in the
corporation paying the dividend, and not more than 25 percent of the gross income of
such paying corporation is derived from interest and dividends, other than interest and
dividends from its own subsidiary corporation. Such reduction of the rate to 5 per-
cent shall not apply if the relationship of the two corporations has been arranged or is
maintained with the intention of securing such reduced rate.
12. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 51, 1965-1 C.B. at 669. At the time of
the Treaty's extension to the Antilles, the Treasury Department reviewed the Antilles tax laws
and found them satisfactory. Letter from John Foster Dules, Secretary of State, to Dwight D.
Eisenhower, President of the United States (July 20, 1954), reprinted in 2 TAx TREArTrs
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incorporated under its laws. 13 For example, the Antilles permits certain
investment companies to elect special income tax treatment as "article 13,
14, or 14A corporations."1 4 Companies that make this "low tax election"
under Antilles law pay a maximum profit tax of 3%. Moreover, the Antilles
does not impose any tax on dividends paid by Antilles corporations to non-
resident shareholders.15 Even under the higher 15% Treaty rate of U.S.
taxation, the total income tax burden of any Antilles investment company
could be as low as 17.55%.16 Qualification for the 5% Treaty rate would of
course further reduce the tax burden. Third country investors took full
advantage17 of this loophole in U.S. taxation of the investment earnings of
nonresidents.18 As a result, the United States not only lost revenue, but
experienced political difficulties as well. 19
These problems led the United States and the Antilles to negotiate a
Protocol to the Treaty.20 The Protocol modifies the Treaty to provide that
Treaty tax rates shall not apply to dividends paid to Antilles companies that
have made the low tax election under articles 13, 14, or 14A.21 But an
(CCH) % 5853 (1971). The "tax haven" aspects apparently came into existence between the
time the Netherlands requested extension of the Treaty to the Antilles, pursuant to article
XXVII of the Treaty, and the date on which the extension went into effect. See Lowe, Cura-
cao Investment Companies: Some Shoals in a Tax Haven, 16 TAX L. REV. 177, 178 (1961).
13. See, eg., M. GRUNDY, GRUNDY'S TAX HAVENS 109-21 (3d ed. 1974); M. LANGER,
HOW TO UsE FOREIGN TAX HAVENS 187-202 (1975).
14. National Ordinance on Profit Tax of 1940, as amended, arts. 13, 14, 14A (Neth. Antil-
les). These articles provide for special taxation of certain types of corporations at one-tenth
the normal Antilles tax rate of up to 30%. SENATE ExEcUTIVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50,
1965-1 C.B. at 668.
15. M. LANGER, supra note 13, at 193.
16. SENATE ExEcuTIvE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50, 1965-1 C.B. at 666. This figure is
computed as follows:
[15% (U.S. tax) x 100% of income] +
[3% (Antilles tax) x 85% of income (100% less 15% U.S. tax)]
= 17.55% tax rate.
17. Nearly 1000 Antilles investment corporations came into existence between 1955 and
1963. Id at 51, 1965-1 C.B. at 669.
18. The United States also gave up its statutory right under I.R.C. § 245(a) to impose a tax
on foreign recipients of dividends paid by Antilles corporations that earned 50% or more of
their gross income over the previous three years in the United States. Article XII of the
Treaty provides that "[d]ividends and interest paid by a Netherlands [Antilles] corporation
shall be exempt from United States tax except where the recipient is a citizen, resident, or
corporation of the United States." Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII. This provision further
reduces the power of the United States to tax the investment income of nonresidents of the
Antilles.
19. Several Latin American countries, for example, felt that the "United States was en-
couraging flight capital from Latin America to be invested in U.S. securities through Nether-
lands Antilles corporations...." M. LANGER, supra note 13, at 194.
20. Treaty, supra note 2, Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Extension to the
Netherlands Antilles of the Convention of April 29, 1948, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Nether-
lands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
21. Protocol, supra note 20, art. I(1); see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
19791
130 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL L4WJOURAL [Vol. 12:127
exception to this provision-the "major ownership exception"-allows an
Antilles company receiving dividends from a U.S. firm to qualify for Treaty
rates if the company "owns" 22 at least 25% of the U.S. firm's stock, regard-
less of whether the company has made the low tax election.23 In order to
qualify for the lower 5% Treaty rate, the Treaty provisions require 95%
ownership of the U.S. firm by the Antilles corporation.24
The Treaty and Protocol each impose limitations on the amount of
income a U.S. firm may derive from "passive investment.125 The Treaty
requires that, in order to qualify for Treaty benefits, the U.S. firm paying
dividends may not obtain more than one-quarter of its income from passive
investment, other than dividends from subsidiaries. The IRS has further
narrowed this 25% passive investment income requirement by imposing
time and evidentiary limitations.26 To qualify for the Protocol's major own-
ership exception, the U.S. firm must derive less than 60% of its income from
passive investment.27 But unlike the Treaty, the Protocol apparently re-
quires inclusion of dividends received from subsidiaries in calculating this
figure.28 If a corporate arrangement qualifies for the major ownership ex-
ception, it must still meet the Treaty's 25% limit on passive investment in
22. Article I(2)(a) of the Protocol requires "ownership," while article VII(l) of the Treaty
requires a certain percentage of direct or indirect "control."
23. Protocol, supra note 20, art. I(2)(a).
24. Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(l). There is apparently no definite rule on what type of
stock must be owned, see id art. VII, or on whether ownership or mere control is required,
Protocol, supra note 20, art. I(2)(a).
25. "Passive investment" is investment that does not involve any contribution other than
money on the part of the investor. Some examples are stocks, bonds, and loans.
26. The Service has interpreted the 25% requirement to mean "not more than 25 percent
of the gross income of the paying corporation for the three-year period immediately preceding
the taxable year in which the dividend is paid. ... 26 C.F.R. § 505.302(c)(1) (1978). See
also Rev. Rul. 74-275, 1974-1 C.B. 376; 26 C.F.R. § 505.302(e)(1) (1978) (U.S. firm must with-
hold at 15% if dividends paid in first year).
Another requirement to qualify for favorable Treaty tax rates is that the Antilles corporation
must "not [be] engaged in trade or business in the United States through a permanent estab-
lishment." Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(l). The Treaty specifically states that a subsidiary of
an Antilles corporation that engages in trade or business in the United States shall not consti-
tute a "permanent establishment." Id. art. II(l)(i). Thus, this requirement is straightforward
and should be easy to satisfy.
27. Protocol, supra note 20, art. I(2)(a).
28. The Service has not explicitly analyzed the relationship of these two passive invest-
ment percentages. In a recent letter ruling, however, the taxpayer was a U.S. holding com-
pany whose income was completely derived from dividends paid by its subsidiaries. The U.S.
company was wholly owned by an Antilles company. The Antilles company did not make the
low tax election. Instead it chose to be taxed under article 8A, see notes 31-32 infra and accom-
panying text, thus completely avoiding the requirements of the Protocol. The Protocol would
not have permitted the U.S. company to withhold at Treaty rates, because of its high percent-
age of dividend income. In contrast, the Treaty's specific exception for dividend payments by
subsidiaries permitted the U.S. company to withhold tax on dividends paid to the Antilles
company at the 5% rate. Letter Rul. No. 7815026.
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order to obtain the Treaty's 5% withholding rate.29
The Treaty also contains an intent requirement. In order to qualify
for the 5% rate, the "relationship of the two corporations [may not have]
been arranged or ... maintained primarily with the intention of securing
[the 5%] rate."30 Although it may defy credulity that complicated corporate
arrangements involving investment in the United States through an Antilles
investment company could arise out of any other purpose, the IRS appar-
ently does not interpret this requirement too strictly.
After the Protocol went into effect the Antilles enacted article 8A, 31
which permits Antilles investment companies to elect to be taxed on U.S.
source income at a special higher rate of 15% of net dividend income. The
IRS has ruled that it does not consider article 8A corporations to have made
a "low tax election." Thus, these corporations are not subject to the Proto-
col's limitations on the Treaty's tax benefits.32
Despite the attempt of the Protocol to close the loopholes in the Treaty,
two major incentives continue to lure third country investors to invest in the
United States through Antilles investment companies. First, the maximum
tax burden on U.S. source dividends received by an article 8A corporation
cannot exceed 27.75%33 and will usually amount to 24% or less. 34 This rate
is preferable, at least to some degree, to the regular U.S. statutory rate of
30%. Second, the major ownership exception permits an article 13, 14, or
14A investment company-if it buys at least 25% of the stock of an Ameri-
can corporation and thereby qualifies for Treaty tax rates--to enjoy Treaty
rates on dividends received from the United States while still paying only
the nominal Antilles profit tax.35
B. THE LETTER RULINGS
Should the IRS permit third country investors, who incorporate wholly
owned Antilles corporations through which to invest in the United States,
29. Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(l).
30. Id. In applications for the 15% Treaty tax rate, this requirement need not be consid-
ered at all. Letter RuL. Nos. 7746046, 7748013.
31. National Ordinance on Profit Tax of 1940, as amended, art. 8A (Neth. Antilles); see
M. LANGEP, supra note 13, at 196 (discussion of article 8A).
32. Rev. RuL 65-16, 1965-1 C.B. 626.
33. The Antilles imposes its tax of 15% on net dividend income, that is, on the amount of
dividend income remaining after subtracting the U.S. tax of 15%. The result is as follows:
[15% (U.S. tax) X 100% of income] +
[15% (N.A. tax) x 85% of income (100% less 15% U.S. tax)]
= 27.75% tax rate.
M. LANGER, supra note 13, at 199.
34. This figure reflects allowable deductions. Id; see Kaplan, Taxation of Dividends and
Interest Under the U.S-Antilles Treaty, 6 TAx MNGM'T INT'L J. 15, 16 (1977).
35. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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to enjoy Treaty tax rates on dividends received? The IRS has not answered
this question definitively by issuing a revenue ruling, a revenue procedure,
or a regulation. But it has addressed the question in several recent private
letter rulings.36 These rulings have permitted U.S. corporations to with-
hold tax at less than the statutory rate on dividends paid to Antilles corpo-
rations that are wholly owned by third country investors. Although the
letter rulings have no precedential value,37 they indicate the Service's gen-
eral position on the subject.
Each of the rulings involves a corporate arrangement that complies
with the literal requirements of the Treaty and Protocol. In all but one of
the rulings, the Antilles corporation apparently made the low tax election.38
But since these Antilles corporations owned at least 25% 39 and usually
owned 95%40 of the stock of the U.S. corporations from which they received
dividends, they fell within the Protocol's major ownership exception 4' and
were eligible for Treaty tax rates. The one ruling not involving a low tax
election concerned an Antilles corporation that had elected to be taxed
under article 8A.42 As a result, the Antilles corporation was eligible for the
benefits of Treaty tax rates regardless of whether it complied with the re-
quirements set forth in the Protocol. 4 3
The U.S. corporations in the rulings--the dividend payors--each met
the passive investment requirements44 of the Treaty and Protocol. In sev-
eral cases, the Service permitted withholding at the 5% rate,45 finding that
the passive investment income of the U.S. corporation did not exceed 25%.
36. Note 9 supra.
37. I.R.C. § 6110()(3). Before a U.S. corporation can withhold tax on dividends paid at
less than the 30% statutory rate, it must proceed in one of two ways: (1) request a favorable
ruling from the Service, Rev. Proc. 66-40, 1966-2 C.B. 1245, §§ 2(b)(1)(iii), 5 (§ 5 describes the
information required as comparable to that in 26 C.F.R. § 505.302(c)(2)(i)-(iv) (1977), which
does not include the ownership of the Antilles corporation); or (2) receive a copy of a "certifi-
cate of status" for the Antilles corporation-payee, issued by the appropriate Antilles authority,
Rev. Proc. 66-40, 1966-2 C.B. 1245, §§ 2(b)(1)(i)-(ii), 4. The U.S. corporation must then file a
copy of this certificate with the Service. Id § 4(a)(3).
38. Letter Rulings 7739080, 7742058, and 7748013 state that the Antilles corporation is
entitled to the benefits of either article 13 or article 14. See note 14 supra and accompanying
text. Letter Ruling 7746046 contains no specific statement regarding the low tax election.
The ruling does, however, cite article 1(2) of the Protocol, which exempts article 13 and 14
corporations from the Protocol's limitations if they fall within the major ownership exception.
See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
39. Letter Rul. No. 7746046.
40. Letter Rul. Nos. 7739080, 7742058, 7748013.
41. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
42. Letter Rul No. 7815026. For a discussion of article 8A, see notes 31-32 supra and
accompanying text.
43. See note 28 supra.
44. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
45. Letter Rul. Nos. 7742048, 7815026.
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In other cases, the Service allowed withholding at the 15% rate.46 In still
other situations, the U.S. corporation had not operated long enough for the
IRS to determine how much of its income was attributable to passive in-
vestment.47 In these situations, the Service allowed withholding at the 15%
Treaty rate pending proof that the U.S. corporation satisfied the stricter
passive investment requirement necessary to qualify for the 5% rate.48
Despite the Treaty's intent requirement, which must be met in order to
obtain the 5% rate, the IRS rarely questioned the structure of the corporate
relationships presented in the rulings. In at least one ruling, the Service
allowed the 5% rate with no mention whatever of the intent requirement.4 9
When the IRS did express concern about intent, tax counsellors were able
to marshal nontaxjustifications for vesting ownership of a U.S. company in
an Antilles corporation that is wholly owned by a third country investor.
Such justifications included access to foreign financial centers, ease of ex-
pansion into foreign markets, and the favorable business climate of the An-
tilles.50
II
INTENT OF THE DRAFTSMEN
Although the IRS may have been correct in finding that the taxpayer
in each of the rulings met the literal requirements of the Treaty and Proto-
col, the Service's failure to look behind the technical compliance of the cor-
porate arrangements may undermine important goals of bilateral tax
treaties. In attempting to determine whether the Service ruled correctly in
giving Treaty tax benefits to third country residents investing in the United
States through Antilles investment companies, the first step is to consider
the intent of the draftsmen of the Treaty and Protocol.
Upon first examination of the Treaty, its intent seems clear: to provide
reciprocal measures for limiting both double taxation and tax avoidance.51
The Treaty specifically states that one of its goals is the "prevention of fiscal
46. Letter Rul. Nos. 7746046, 7748013.
47. Letter RuL Nos. 7739080, 7742058.
48. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
49. Letter RuL No. 7815026.
50. See Letter Rul. No. 7739080; id, Background File (on file at the Cornell International
Law Journal). In this ruling, the tax advisor had composed extensive descriptions of the ad-
vantages of the Antilles location and of the international character of the company. Id Ap-
parently the IRS accepted these representations as evidencing nontax reasons for the corporate
structure. The Service gave the taxpayer permission to withhold at the 15% rate for one year,
after which it could reapply for the 5% rate. Letter Rul. No. 7739080.
51. The Treaty and Protocol, as presently applied, certainly aid in preventing double taxa-
tion, since-far from being burdened with double taxation--third country investors may be
taxed at just over half the rate that appears to be contemplated. See note 16 supra and accom-
panying text. In addition, the Treaty contains a competent authority provision, enabling an
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evasion with respect to taxes on income.' '52 To this end, the agreement
contains provisions for the exchange of information between U.S. and An-
tilles tax authorities,53 and for reciprocal enforcement assistance.54 The
intent requirement necessary to qualify for the 5% Treaty rate also indicates
that the draftsmen sought to deny Treaty benefits to schemes designed to
facilitate tax avoidance or evasion. Nevertheless, the original Treaty ap-
parently provided numerous opportunities for abuse by foreign investors, as
is evidenced by the large number of Antilles investment companies that
came into existence during the period when only the Treaty was in force.55
Such problems prompted U.S. tax authorities to negotiate the Protocol.
The express intent of the Protocol was to curb the use of nonresident-owned
Antilles investment companies to avoid U.S. taxation.56 While the Senate
was considering ratification of the Protocol, the Treasury Department ex-
pressed concern over the increased use of the Treaty as a tax avoidance
device during the period subsequent to its extension to the Antilles.57 The
Treasury noted that the Treaty had not been "intended to reduce the tax
burden of the investor."58 In addition, the fact that U.S. tax authorities
negotiated provisions cutting off tax benefits to low-tax-election Antilles
corporations indicates their intent to prevent the use of these corporations
to escape the full tax on dividends coming from the United States.
Despite these indications of an intent to exclude low-tax-election Antil-
les corporations from Treaty tax rates, the Protocol's major ownership ex-
ception seems to bring about a contrary result. The legislative history of
this provision offers no explanation of why it was included in the Protocol,
and there is no counterpart to the major ownership exception in the original
Treaty.
The draftsmen of the Protocol realized that they were not closing all of
the loopholes in the Treaty. For example, they decided against eliminating
Treaty article XII, which surrenders the right of the United States to tax
U.S. source dividends paid by Antilles corporations to their shareholders.59
The Treasury reasoned that such a "secondary tax" would discourage for-
eign portfolio investment in the United States and thus would harm the
aggrieved taxpayer to petition his country's tax authorities to attempt to negotiate a compro-
mise with officials of the other nation. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXI.
52. Id preamble.
53. Id art. XXI.
54. Id art. XXII.
55. See note 17 supra.
56. SENATE ExEcuTm REPORT, supra note 5, at 50-52, 1965-1 C.B. at 669.
57. Id at 50-51, 1965-1 C.B. at 669.
58. Id at 51, 1965-1 C.B. at 669 (emphasis added).
59. Id at 47, 52, 1965-1 C.B. at 666, 669. Without this provision, the United States could
tax the shareholders of the Antilles corporation if the corporation had received 50% or more of
its gross income from U.S. sources in the preceding three years. I.R.C. § 245(a).
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U.S. balance of payments position.60 This rationale does not, however, jus-
tify the inclusion of the major ownership exception, since this provision
appears to promote long-term direct investment, rather than portfolio hold-
ings, by nonresidents.61
Although the express intent of the Protocol was to prevent the use of
the Treaty as a tax avoidance device by third country investors, the major
ownership exception does not comport with this stated intent. Such a con-
ffict between intent and operative provisions calls for an examination of
past judicial interpretation of tax treaties, the Internal Revenue Code and
the policies that underlie both. This analysis may illuminate principles
that the Service should employ in determining whether to extend Treaty
benefits to third country investors.
III
PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY
A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES: THE .4iKEzN
REPRESENTATION
The taxpayers in several of the rulings represented to the IRS that the
Antilles corporation receiving dividends is under no obligation to pay any
portion of those dividends to any other person or entity, subject only to the
rights of creditors. 62 The corporation, if it were under such an obligation,
would be vulnerable to attack under several recent cases-including Aiken
Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner-63-in which the IRS successfully chal-
lenged conduit arrangements that conferred tax treaty benefits on third
country investors. Several requests for permission to obtain Antilles
Treaty tax rates have therefore included this "Aiken representation," appar-
ently to ensure against an IRS finding that the Antilles corporation is
merely a conduit for transferring profits to third country investors. 64
60. SENATE ExEcUTIVE REPORT, supra note 5, at 52, 1965-1 C.B. at 669.
61. This is particularly true because the concern of the Treasury was focused on "our
present imbalance of international payments," id at 52, 1965-1 C.B. at 669 (emphasis added),
and not on the longer run.
62. Letter Rul. No. 7739080, at 2 ("Nothing in the corporate charter or by-laws. . . would
require or cause it to turn over dividends received by it to any other person or entity and [it]
will exercise dominion and control over dividends paid out:'); Letter Rul. No. 7742058, at 2
('The corporate charter.. . does not require it to distribute dividends it receives to any other
party."); Letter Rul. No. 7815026, at 2 ("[It] will have no obligation to pay any portion of
dividends received by it... to any other person and, subject to the rights of its creditors, will
be free to use such dividends as it sees fit.").
63. 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
64. Letter Rul. Nos. 7739080, 7742058, 7815026. If no such assertion had been made, the
IRS might have considered the third country investor to have constructively received the divi-
dends, thus negating the Treaty's residency requirement. See Treaty, sufpra note 2, art. II(l)(c)-
(d).
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Aiken involved a Bahamian parent corporation that made a loan to a
U.S. subsidiary and received a note bearing 4% interest in return. The par-
ent then assigned the note to a Honduran subsidiary in consideration for
notes totaling the same amount, also bearing 4% interest. The U.S. subsidi-
ary made interest payments directly to the Honduran subsidiary, which in
turn paid interest on its notes to the Bahamian parent. The purpose of this
elaborate arrangement was to take advantage of the interest payments ex-
emption in the United States-Honduras tax treaty.65 The Tax Court stated
that "while. . .a tax avoidance motive is not inherently fatal to a transac-
tion,. . . such a motive standing by itself is not a business purpose which is
sufficient to support a transaction for tax purposes."'66 After examining the
structure of the "corporate family," the court found that the Honduran sub-
sidiary "was merely a conduit for the passage of interest payments from
[the U.S. subsidiary] to [the Bahamian parent], and it cannot be said to have
received the interest as its own." 67 Such an arrangement fell outside the
intent of the treaty, and therefore the corporations could not take advantage
of the treaty tax rate.68
Although Aiken is the only case decided on the ground of a corporate
conduit arrangement, two other cases might contribute to an IRS analysis
of whether to allow dividend withholding under the Antilles Treaty. In
Perry A Bass,69 the Tax Court examined whether a corporation and the
taxpayer who owned and controlled it were separate entities. Bass, an indi-
vidual taxpayer, had established a Swiss corporation and had conducted
operations through it in order to take advantage of the United States-Swit-
zerland tax treaty.7° The court set forth the rule that although a taxpayer
may use any legal method to minimize his tax liability,71 if he uses a corpo-
ration it must be "a viable business entity, that is, it must have been formed
for a substantial business purpose or actually engage in substantive business
activity."72 In Bass, the court found that the corporation was in fact a
viable entity and thus could take advantage of the treaty tax rates.73
The Court of Claims, in determining whether a corporation qualified
65. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, June 25, 1956, United States-Hon-
duras, 8 U.S.T. 219, T.I.A.S. No. 3766, terminated, Dec. 31, 1966.
66. 56 T.C. at 934. Similarly, in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960), the
Supreme Court stated: "[lit is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by
Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax deduction."
67. 56 T.C. at 934.
68. Id
69. 50 T.C. 595 (1968).
70. Id at 601; Income Tax Convention, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2
U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
71. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
72. 50 T.C. at 600.
73. Id at 602.
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for tax treaty benefits, utilized several factors to ascertain the corporation's
nationality. In Compagnie Financire de Suez v. United States,74 the Egyp-
tian Government nationalized a company that had been created and oper-
ated under Egyptian law for over 100 years. France then enacted
legislation stating that the company was governed by French law. This led
the company to claim that, as a French corporation, it qualified for the tax
rate established by the United States-France tax treaty.75 The Court of
Claims examined the circumstances of the company's creation, operations,
and prior tax payments. It found that the French legislature's action and
certain other ties to France did not alter the fact that the company was an
Egyptian corporation76 and was therefore not eligible for the treaty tax
rate.7
7
Each of these cases reveals the willingness of courts to probe the
superficial structure of a corporate relationship to determine whether the
parties qualify for treaty benefits. Taxpayers may certainly arrange transac-
tions to produce the lowest tax legally possible. But the transaction must
not be a sham, 78 and it should fall within the intent of the treaty that cre-
ated the exemption.7 9 But the IRS has apparently demanded no assur-
ances that Antilles corporations such as those in the letter rulings actually
have "dominion and control' 80 over the dividends they receive to qualify
for Treaty benefits. Although the taxpayers in some rulings made anAiken
representation,81 others did not.82 Whether or not the taxpayer made an
Aiken representation, the IRS has not scrutinized the Antilles corporations
to determine if they were in fact mere conduits for channeling dividends to
third country investors. Indeed, the IRS seems generally unconcerned
about the possibility of third country investors reaping Treaty benefits
through the medium of an Antilles investment corporation.83
74. 492 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
75. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967, United
States-France, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
76. 492 F.2d at 809.
77. md at 811.
78. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940); Harbour Properties, Inc., 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 580, 632-33 (1973).
79. See, e.g., Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1963), afl'd, 373 U.S.
49 (1963); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). Butsee Perry R. Bass, 50 T.C. 595
(1968) (corporation with no apparent purpose beyond tax reduction allowed to take advantage
of tax treaty).
80. Letter Rul. No. 7739080, at 2.
81. See note 62 supra.
82. Letter Rul. Nos. 7746046, 7748013.
83. The use of the -iken representation raises the question of the status of preferred share-
holders. If a third country investor owns preferred stock, which is entitled to receive divi-
dends under all or nearly all circumstances, does the corporation have an "obligation" to pay
dividends to him? Alternatively, a third country investor might structure the Antilles corpora-
tion so that his contribution was in the form of a loan. Does his right to receive interest
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B. THE CODE: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
U.S. income tax law, both in the Code and in its administrative imple-
mentation, has been hostile to use of the corporate form for evasion or
avoidance of tax liability. The goal of taxing the substance and not merely
the form84 of transactions has prompted the enactment of several anti-tax
avoidance sections of the Code. Although none of these sections apply di-
rectly to the use of the Antilles Treaty by third country investors,85 the pro-
visions illustrate the type of transaction or arrangement considered suspect
by Congress and the IRS.
Legislative and administrative attempts to elevate substance over form
have focused on specific facts and circumstances, the taxpayer's motives, or
a combination of the two. The "facts and circumstances" approach is typi-
fied by the "branch rule."86 Enacted as a regulation pursuant to Subpart
F,87 the rule applies to branches of controlled foreign corporations (CFC's)
that do business outside the country in which the CFC is incorporated. 8 8
The Service will examine the arrangement, using specific numerical stand-
ards, 89 to determine whether the corporate structure as a whole has enjoyed
significant tax savings by operating through branches rather than through
wholly owned subsidiaries.90 If the Service determines that such tax sav-
ings have occurred, it will treat the branch as a wholly owned subsidiary,
thus rendering the U.S. shareholder of the CFC taxable on the branch's
profits.9 1
Alternatively, the Service may look to the taxpayer's intent to deter-
mine whether he is misusing the corporate form. Perhaps the best example
of a provision authorizing such an examination is section 269 of the Code.92
Pursuant to this section, the IRS may disallow any tax benefits93 that a
payments, rather than dividends, mean that he is a "creditor," and thus not covered by an
Aiken representation?
84. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
85. The most obvious reason for the inapplicability of the provisions to third country in-
vestors is that these investors usually are not actual or potential U.S. taxpayers.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(b) (1964). See M. MOORE & R. BAGLEY, U.S. TAX AsPECTS OF
DOING BUSIFess ABROAD 130-31(1978).
87. I.R.C. §§ 951-964. Subpart F taxes U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign corpora-
tions on their pro rata share of the corporation's income, if certain control tests are met. For
detailed discussions of the provisions of Subpart F, see Note, Controlled Foreign Corporations.-
Determining Control Under Subpart F, I1I CORNELL INT'L L.J. 343 (1978); M. MOORE & R.
BAGLEY, supra note 86, at 115-46.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(b)(1)(i)(a) (1967).
89. Id §§ 1.954-3(b)(1)(i)(b), 1.954-3(b)(4).
90. Id § 1.954-3(b)(I)(i)(b).
91. Id For other statutory patterns that utilize a "facts and circumstances" approach, see
I.R.C. §§ 267, 541-547, 551-558.
92. I.R.C. § 269.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-1(a) (1962).
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taxpayer would otherwise obtain by acquiring a corporation, if the tax-
payer's principal purpose in making the acquisition was to evade or avoid
federal income tax.94 The regulations, in outlining the circumstances that
may produce such a determination, stress a variety of business-related fac-
tors.95 Another set of Code provisions96 imposes an excise tax on certain
transfers. The taxpayer can exempt himself from this tax by showing that
he did not make the transfers "in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes."'97
Finally, some Code sections and the regulations promulgated pursuant
to them employ both a "facts and circumstances" approach and an intent
standard in determining whether to give effect to the corporate form for tax
purposes.98
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Third country investors who benefit from the Antilles Treaty under-
mine the usefulness of treaties as a means of preventing double taxation.
The Service's failure to curb this misuse of the Treaty amounts to giving
away a benefit that would otherwise become part of a treaty package pro-
viding similar advantages for each country.99 If the United States were to
insist on a quid pro quo for tax concessions such as lower dividend with-
holding rates, foreign investors would have an incentive to press their gov-
ernments to negotiate tax treaties with the United States. Conversely, if
residents of nontreaty countries can obtain treaty tax rates by merely chan-
neling their money through the Antilles or another treaty country, the non-
treaty countries will lose part of their incentive to seek tax treaties with the
United States.
In addition, granting these benefits to third country investors without
careful examination of the underlying corporate arrangements is inequita-
ble because it favors the wealthy investor. To qualify for the major owner-
ship exception and thus to reap Treaty tax benefits as well as low Antilles
profit tax rates, an investor must own at least 25% of a U.S. corporation.
Such a large investment is beyond the means of most individuals. Ob-
94. I.R.C. § 269(a).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2(b) (1962).
96. I.R.C. §§ 1491-1494.
97. Id § 1492(2).
98. See id §§ 482, 531-537.
99. A similar point was made by opponents of a recent proposal to eliminate all withhold-
ing tax on dividends paid by U.S. corporations to foreign investors. Foreign Portfolio Invest-
ments in the United States, Hearing Before the Subcomn. on International Finance and
Resources ofthe Senate Comm on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1976) (statement of Hugh
J. Ault); id at 25 (statement of Peggy Musgrave).
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taining these benefits also requires sophisticated tax planning-again, a
province of the wealthy investor.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
Past judicial interpretation of tax treaties, the Code, and policy consid-
erations all suggest that the Service should discourage third country inves-
tors from using Antilles companies for reducing taxes on U.S. investments.
A. TREATY RENEGOTIATION
The most comprehensive resolution of the present situation would be a
renegotiation of the Treaty to eliminate loopholes and consequently to en-
hance the ability of U.S. tax authorities to deal with tax avoidance under
the Treaty. Renegotiation of the Treaty should have as its goal the elimi-
nation of the tax avoidance opportunities that stem from entering into a tax
treaty with a tax haven. First, the negotiators should attempt to eliminate
the major ownership exception. This would prevent third country inves-
tors from obtaining both Treaty tax rates and Antilles low tax benefits. Re-
negotiation could thus accomplish the original intent of the Protocol's
draftsmen, which was to curtail avoidance of U.S. income taxes. Second,
the United States should attempt to eliminate article XII from the Treaty.
This article surrenders the right of the U.S. to impose a secondary tax on
dividends paid to third country investors by Antilles corporations. If the
United States were to reclaim this right, as it has done in negotiations with
other tax havens, t°° tax authorities could recapture excess dividends paid
by U.S. corporations to Antilles shareholders.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
It is unlikely, however, that renegotiation will occur in the foreseeable
future.' 0 ' The Service should therefore act immediately to promulgate
regulations stating its intention to examine corporate arrangements that
benefit third country investors. The regulations should provide a method
100. At the same time that the Senate approved the Protocol, it also examined the tax treaty
the United States had just signed with Luxembourg, Convention with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No.
5726. That treaty permitted the United States to impose a secondary tax on dividends paid to
third country investors by Luxembourg low-tax corporations. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 12, 1965-1 C.B. at 641; id at 47, 1965-1 C.B. at 666. For a general discussion
of article XII of the Treaty, see note 18 supra; notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
101. Part of the problem with renegotiation is that many other treaties are currently under
negotiation or renegotiation. As of May 1977, the United States was negotiating treaties with
at least 14 other countries. See 2 TAX TREATiEs (CCH) 9748 (May 31, 1977).
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for determining whether these corporate structures are mere conduits or in
fact have some legitimate business purpose. Such a regulation would find
support not only in general principles of tax law-judicial, legislative, and
administrative-but also as a means of implementing the express intent of
the Treaty and Protocol.
The IRS should inform taxpayers of the factors that will support a
finding that the Antilles corporation is a conduit and thus not entitled to
Treaty tax rates. The Service should require the taxpayer to make the
Aiken representation that the Antilles corporation is under no obligation to
pay dividends to its shareholders. In most cases, however, this should not
end the inquiry. To limit tax avoidance, the IRS should insist on some
nexus between the Antilles corporation in question and the Antilles, beyond
the mere filing of papers. Also, the Service should consider the number of
third country shareholders of each Antilles corporation. An investment
company with only one third country investor is more likely to be a conduit
than one owned by several such investors.
The primary emphasis of the regulation should be on whether the cor-
porate arrangement has some legitimate, nontax, business purpose. The
IRS has already evidenced some concern about this question,102 but it
should clarify the factors that will indicate or negate a finding that a busi-
ness purpose exists. For example, where the third country investor has ac-
cess to the profits of the Antilles company without substantial restrictions,
the Service should disallow Treaty tax benefits. 103 In less egregious cases,
the IRS should utilize a reasonableness standard similar to that employed
in certain sections ofcthe Code. It should consider the taxpayer's justifica-
tions for the corporate structure and whether the arrangement appears to be
appropriate for these stated purposes. °4
Finally, perhaps in conjunction with this examination, the Service
should employ an intent test. Where so much of the purpose of a corporate
arrangement is tax-related, it would be unrealistic to demand that the tax-
payer have no intent to "avoid" taxes. Nevertheless, the regulations should
disallow Treaty benefits where the "principal purpose" of the arrangement
is tax evasion or avoidance.' 05 This standard should enable tax authorities
to deny Treaty tax rates to a sham Antilles corporation, while permitting an
102. For example, the Service pressed at least one tax planner to justify using an investment
company located in the Antilles. After several exchanges, the IRS eventually accepted the
asserted business purposes as sound. Letter Rul. No. 7739080, Background File (on file at the
Cornell International Law Journal); see note 50 supra.
103. For an analogous standard, see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957). This regulation permits
the Service to find that a taxpayer has constructively received income when he has control over
its receipt. Id § 1.451-2(a).
104. See I.R.C. § 269; notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
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investor with a legitimate business purpose to incorporate in the Antilles
and to enjoy Treaty benefits.
CONCLUSION
The United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty gives third country
investors who incorporate in the Antilles the opportunity to reduce the rate
of tax they must pay on dividend income received from U.S. corporations.
Attempts to limit these advantages have met with limited success, despite
numerous policy justifications for restricting the availability of Treaty tax
rates. This situation calls for a new approach by U.S. tax authorities, pref-
erably renegotiation of the Treaty to eliminate loopholes and improve en-
forcement. For the present, the IRS should issue regulations indicating its
intention to curb abuses of the Treaty and setting out standards for denying
Treaty benefits to corporate arrangements created solely for tax avoidance
purposes.
Kathleen A. Bursley
